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Niall Ferguson has argued that, more than any other event, the capture of New Orleans in
late April 1862 was the true turning point of the American Civil War. The South’s loss of its
largest port and its consequent inability to export cotton effectively torpedoed the market for
cotton-backed Confederate bonds and ended any hope of raising badly needed foreign capital to
prosecute the war. Starved of funds, the Confederate government (as well as various states,
municipalities, and forgers) had no choice but to print massive quantities of unbacked paper
money to finance the war effort, thereby causing runaway inflation and general economic
collapse.1 But long before those events came to pass, the fall of New Orleans precipitated other
more immediate financial crises for the Confederacy, such as the loss of eight million dollars in
badly needed gold and silver coin still locked in the vaults of bankers whose loyalty to the
Confederacy was questionable at best.2 For the citizenry at large, the panic buying and
hyperinflation that one would expect of a city about to experience an uncertain occupation was
compounded by a controversial general order (no, not that one) from Maj. Gen. Benjamin Butler
that radically transformed the nature of money almost overnight, forcing residents to adjust to the
new reality of commerce in creative ways. Two fascinating sources in the LSU Libraries Special
Collections document this monetary crisis, one from a New Orleans grocer whose business both
suffered and prospered from the calamity, and the other from a Federal soldier who both
observed the fluctuating value of money and fortuitously discovered the benefits of bartering in
the wake of the city’s fall.

1
Niall Ferguson, The Ascent of Money: A Financial History of the World (New York: Penguin Press,
2008), 92-97.
2
Douglas B. Ball, Financial Failure and Confederate Defeat (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1991),
126-129.
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H.A. Snyder, a native of New York and a small merchant engaged in the grocery business
in New Orleans, kept a diary for the year 1862.3 On Friday, April 25, which he dubbed “Gloomy
Friday” in his journal, Snyder acknowledged Admiral David Farragut’s successful passing of
Forts Jackson and St. Philip, writing, “the five bells throughout the city rung the general alarm,
twelve times, twelve strokes, which was the signal that the enemy was approaching.” On that
day, the Confederate Guards, a Louisiana militia unit to which Snyder belonged, was sent by
train some eighty miles north to Camp Moore on order of Maj. Gen. Mansfield Lovell, the
military commander responsible for defending the city. The Confederate Guards proved an
unwilling outfit, grumbling and blaming Lovell for taking them away from their families who
remained in the city, so those who did not want to stay were discharged on April 30 and returned
to New Orleans by train the next day. Snyder was among the returnees, arriving in the city at six
o’clock in the evening and quickly reuniting with his wife and children. A half hour later, Union
soldiers marched into the city. Evidently, the Snyder family harbored unionist sentiments,
because “Phebe’s joy was almost unbounded when she saw the beautiful Stars & Stripes floating
proudly at the head of the column.”
Snyder returned to work to find customers continuously flooding his store in search of
groceries. On May 5 he wrote, “In the afternoon, went around among my grocer acquaintances to
learn the price of goods. There is but very little provisions of any kind in the city.” The prices of
flour, fresh meat, bacon, coffee, sugar, rancid butter “(there is none good in town)” all hit
unbelievable highs. Uncertainty about the money supply worsened the situation, for on May 6,
“Went about town attending to business. Had a long round hunt for sugar & rice—very few
holders are willing to sell under the present unsettled state of our currency.” The worries
continued the next day: “Collected bills of Meekins, Kelley & Co. they paid me in Confederate
treasury notes & shinplasters, which are rather doubtful now.” Nonetheless, Snyder continued to
buy as much as he could and tried unsuccessfully to collect on debts.
Everything changed on Saturday, May 17:
In this morning’s papers appears an order from Genl. Butler prohibiting all traffic in
Confederate notes or bonds on & after the 27th inst under a penalty of confiscation of
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property, one fourth to go to the informer.4 In consequence of said order citizens having
such treasury notes on hand are very anxious to get rid of them. Everybody seems to be
out today purchasing something with Confederate money. My store has been crowded all
day until about 4 P.M. when Phebe closed the front doors with customers anxious to buy
something to eat, regardless of the high prices charged for goods today.
On Monday, May 19, after spending the morning making purchases for the store with
Confederate money, Snyder wrote,
Opened store about 10 A.M. & commenced to regulate things, but had no chance.
Customers began to pour in & the store was crowded till about 4 P.M. Closed the front
doors about 3 P.M. but could not get the crowd away till about 4 o’clock, then went to
dinner, but was called away twice to deliver some goods & finally left without finishing
dinner. Customers would slip in by crowds whenever the door was opened & kept me
busy till near dark. Had one white man & two negroes helping me today—cash sales
about $300.00 in Confederate notes. The enormous high price of goods don’t check the
purchasers.
Despite closing the next day to put the store in order, desperate customers still wormed
their way into the shop.
At the close of business on Saturday, May 24, Snyder remarked how exceptionally busy
his store had been the past week, as well as other stores that accepted Confederate money. High
prices didn’t matter. “My recei[p]ts have averaged through the week from $250.00 to nearly
$800.00 per day—about one half being net profit.” The panic buying continued as the deadline
neared. He collected nearly $800 on Monday, May 26, and purchased sugar and groceries “to be
paid for in Confederate money this eve[n]ing or tomorrow morning.”
The rush ended predictably. Writing on Saturday, May 31, Snyder reflected,
Business has been quite moderate through the week since Monday—yet I have had
enough to do with the assistance of one colored man. A number of persons have called on
me since Monday with Confederate money to buy groceries, saying that was all the
money they had. I was willing to receive their money to relieve their distress, but did not
dare to. So I went to Genl. Butler to get his permission to receive it, but he refused sternly
& positively.

4
This was General Order No. 29, dated May 16, 1862. General Order No. 30, dated May 19, 1862,
mandated that banks cease paying out Confederate notes to their depositors, but use only bank bills, greenbacks,
gold, or silver. The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate
Armies (Washington: GPO, 1886), Ser. I, vol. 15, pp. 426, 437-438.
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Luther M. Fairbank was a farm laborer from Ware, Massachusetts, who enlisted as a
private in Company D of the 31st Massachusetts Infantry Regiment, which was organized in
Pittsfield, Massachusetts, in late 1861.5 The regiment served primarily in the Department of the
Gulf and was aboard the flotilla witnessing the bombardment of Forts Jackson and St. Philip.
Writing to his sister on May 1, he described the considerable yet surprisingly ineffective
firepower of the now-surrendered forts, musing on how the Union navy ever managed to pass
them: “Either they did not want to fight or they were poor marksmen it was the former I guess
for our Leut. told us that 400 raised mutiny and refused to fight,” subsequently “there was about
250 prisioners [sic] who took the oath of allegiance and gave three cheers for the Union.”
Fairbank’s company was the first to land at New Orleans (“We had no trouble at the least there
were no flags flying but they were insulting as could be they call us all names that could be
thought of”) before escorting Gen. Butler and his staff into the city to the customhouse.
About a week later, writing on May 11, Fairbank described the desperate condition of the
city,
We don’t take much of an insult from them now but if any man cheers for Jeff or
Beauregard we take him prisioner [sic] so it makes things pretty still but the greatest of it
is that they won’t take their own money. Gen. Butler gave them leave to use it for the
present for you have read his proclamation before now but there is the greatest jawing
about the dammed shin plasters.6 They all hate to take it now. I think they will get it out
of circulation on their own hook if they keep on we live just about as we are a mind to
here for we can take our hard crackers for we draw 8 a day and trade them for sugar
molasses segars [i.e., cigars] oranges any such thing to tell the truth the people here are in
a starving condition they are ready to take any things we have left that other ways we
should throw away and they do pick up the pieces of crackers that are thrown into the
street if what we see here in New Orleans is a specimen of secession it is in a hard fix.
The usefulness of hard tack for currency still persisted two weeks later. Fairbank wrote
on May 24, “What do you think of it? We have got our wash women each man in the company
pay $1.00 a month for the washing and she draws her rations besides. We live high and sleep in
5
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the garret after eating all we have to do is to just pass out 2 hard crackers and get a cegar our
crackers are as good as money here for such things.”
About a month later in early June, Fairbank addressed his sister,
You wrote about sending you some relics of the war I have sent you when I first came to
the city I sent you some rebel papers and letters and postage stamps and $2 D[ollar]
shinplaster that money is just as good as a $2 bill of Ware bank is there I don’t know
whether you have received them or not now I will send you a picayune as 5 cts is called
here there being no silver they have to use paper money I want you to keep it and not
carry it in your pocket for I shall want it to remember.
Outlawed Confederate currency rapidly was becoming merely an aid to memory for the
people of New Orleans as well, and in less than three years, this worthless paper money similarly
would become no more than a familiar curiosity for the entire South.
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